Abstract. Assuming that Alice and Bob use a secret noisy channel (modelled by a binary symmetric channel) to send a key, reconciliation is the process of correcting errors between Alice's and Bob's version of the key. This is done by public discussion, which leaks some information about the secret key to an eavesdropper. We show how to construct protocols that leak a minimum amount of information. However this construction cannot be implemented e ciently. If Alice and Bob are willing to reveal an arbitrarily small amount of additional information (beyond the minimum) then they can implement polynomial-time protocols. We also present a more e cient protocol, which leaks an amount of information acceptably close to the minimum possible for su ciently reliable secret channels (those with probability of any symbol being transmitted incorrectly as large as 15%). This work improves on earlier reconciliation approaches R, BBR, BBBSS].
Introduction
Unlike public key cryptosystems, the security of quantum cryptography relies on the properties of the channel connecting Alice and Bob. Physical imperfections in a quantum channel introduce noise into the messages passing through it. The presence of an eavesdropper wiretapping the channel disrupts communication even more. Assuming that Alice and Bob are using a quantum channel or any noisy channel to send a secret key, they would need to reconcile their keys to make them identical. Reconciliation is the process of nding and correcting discrepancies between the secret key sent by Alice and the one received by Bob. This is done by public discussion. In this paper we focus on secret noisy channels modelled by binary symmetric channels.
An eavesdropper can gain information about the secret key both by wiretapping the quantum channel and by listening to the public reconciliation. This information can be eliminated using a privacy ampli cation protocol R, BBR] at the cost of reducing the secret key size proportionally to the amount of information potentially known by an eavesdropper. Since using a quantum channel is expensive, we would like to minimize the information that a reconciliation protocol divulges.
A quantum public key distribution protocol is described in BBBSS] , which also discusses a way to combine together reconciliation and privacy ampli cation. The problem of reconciliation has been previously studied in R, BBR, BBBSS] . Key distribution using independent channels M] also requires reconciliation.
In section 3 we de ne the problem and introduce the notion of optimality; in section 4 we show how to construct optimal protocols. In section 5 we discuss e ciency; in sections 6 and 7 we present protocols that can be used in practice.
Preliminaries
Let fp(x)g x2X be a probability distribution over a nite set X. The entropy of X, denoted H(X), is de ned as H(X) = ? X x2X p(x) log p(x) (where all logarithms are to the base 2). In particular, H(X) is the expected value of the number of bits required to specify a particular event in X. It is easy to observe that H(X) log jXj with equality i p(x) = 1=jXj for each x 2 X. When X is a Bernoulli trial with parameter p, we denote H(X) by h(p).
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution fp(x; y)g x2X;y2Y , the conditional entropy H(XjY ) is de ned as H(XjY ) = ? X y2Y X x2X p(y)p(xjy) log p(xjy):
A binary symmetric channel (BSC) permits transmission of a string of bits, each independently exposed to noise with probability p. Let A be the string sent by Alice and let B be the one received by Bob. If each bit from string A is randomly and independently chosen, it is clear that H(A) = jAj:
The conditional entropy of A given B is H(AjB) = H(A B) = nh(p)
where n = jAj = jBj. Henceforth we will denote a binary symmetric channel with parameter p by BSC(p).
The quantum channel is an example of a secret binary symmetric channel even if an eavesdropper introduces noise in a non-symmetric way. Before Alice and Bob reconcile their strings, they perform a sample of the transmitted bits to estimate the error rate of the actual quantum communication. If the estimate is acceptably close to the expected error rate of the channel then they publicly and randomly permute their respective string on which reconciliation is then applied.
Bob's string can now be assumed to be the result of a transmission over a BSC.
If the estimate is not su ciently close to the expected error rate then they rule out the communication and retry later (consult BBBSS] for more details).
For 0 1 2 the tail inequality is
For X a random variable with nite variance V (X) and expected value E(X) and for a > 0 the Chebyshev inequality is prob(jX ? E(X)j a) V ar(X) a 2 :
The Hamming distance dist(A; B) between A and B is the number of places in which A and B di er. The weight w(A) of A is its number of nonzero positions.
The Problem
Suppose there is a secret channel between Alice and Bob on which Alice transmits to Bob an n-bit string A such that H(A) = n. We model the secret channel with a BSC(p) for some p. Bob then receives an n-bit string B such that H(AjB) = nh(p). Using public discussion Alice and Bob want to share an n-bit secret string S obtained from A and B. This can be done assuming an unjammable public channel without making any other security assumptions. Our goal is to nd protocols minimizing the information on S that an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power can get by listening on the public channel.
A reconciliation protocol R p is de ned by Alice's and Bob's algorithms. R p runs on strings A and B to produce string S by exchanging some information Q on the public channel. This will be denoted by R p = S; Q] or by R p (A; B) = S; Q] when a speci c A and B are considered. If the protocol fails to produce S 2 f0; 1g n we will write S =?. The amount of leaked information I E (S j Q) is the expected amount of Shannon information that an eavesdropper E can get on S given Q.
De nition 1. A reconciliation protocol R p is "{robust, 0 " 1, if (9N 0 ("))(8n N 0 (")) X ; 2f0;1g n prob(A = ; B = )prob (R p Theorem 4. Protocol 1 is optimal for an adequate choice of parameter m.
Proof (sketch). Let p be the BSC parameter. Let p e be the decoding error probability. Let C = A B and E be the event associated with a decoding error. Clearly w(C) Bin(n; p) 3 . A simple counting argument shows that prob(:E j w(C) r) (1 ? 1=2 m ) P r j=1 ? n j :
For correct decoding to occur it is su cient that all the strings B 0 such that dist(B 0 ; B) dist(B; A) with B 0 6 = A be distributed among those 2 m ? 1 elements of the image of f that are not equal to f(A).
The decoding error probability is:
prob(E j w(C) r) + prob(w(C) > r): Let r = bnp + n" n c and " n = 1= log n. The Chebyshev inequality gives prob(w(C) > r) = prob(w(C) > bnp + n" n c)
If w(C) r, the decoding probability error is bounded by:
prob ( For m = d log n + nh(p + " n )e and n = d log ne we obtain:
prob(E j w(C) r) 1 ?
? 1 e 2 ?m P r j=0 ? n j :
By the tail inequality the decoding probability error is bounded by:
prob(E j w(C) r) 1 ? e ?2 nh(p+"n)?m : When n ! 1 we have p e = 0, and protocol 1 is "{robust for all " > 0. It is easy to see that the resulting amount m of leaked information is asymptotically equal to nh(p).
u t
To solve the problem that choosing a random function from a huge set is unreasonable, we choose it from a universal 2 class of hash functions CW].
De nition 5 ( CW] ). Let H be a class of functions from F to G. We say that H is universal 2 if for all x; y 2 F such that x 6 = y, the number of functions f in H such that f(x) = f(y) is less or equal than #H=#G.
Wegman and Carter CW, WC] also describe classes for which choosing and evaluating functions can be achieved e ciently. The following theorem shows that choosing f among a universal 2 class ensures the protocol's optimality.
Theorem 6. Protocol 1 is optimal for an adequate choice of parameter m if Alice and Bob choose f among an universal 2 class of functions.
Proof. In order to bound the decoding error probability we must bound the probability that:
f(C) 6 = f(x 1 )^f(C) 6 = f(x 2 )^: : :^f(C) 6 = f(x l ) for C 2 F, x i 2 F where x i 6 = C for each i. From de nition 5, for any C 2 F and x 1 2 F the following is true:
Therefore, the number of functions where f(C) 6 = f(x 1 ) is greater than #H(1 ? 1=#G). Among the #H ? #H=#G remaining functions, there are at most #H=#G functions such that f(C) = f(x 2 ). Applying this argument over the l points in the domain of f gives #ff 2 H j f(C) 6 = f(x i ) pour 1 i lg #H(1 ? l=#G). Let X(r) = fx 2 f0; 1g n j w(x) r et x 6 = Cg be the set of strings of weight r or less. Similar to the proof of theorem 4 we have:
prob(E j w(C) r) = 1 ? prob(:E j w(C) r) #X(r) #G :
The proof follows by setting F = f0; 1g n , G = f0; 1g m for r, " n , n and m set as in theorem 4 (since #X(r) 2 nh(p+"n) ).
u t
Thus we have a way to automatically generate optimal reconciliation protocols by specifying a universal 2 class in a short and e cient way. The problem with this approach is that there are no known e cient algorithms for Bob to compute the decoded string B 0 .
E ciency
Finding a class of functions for which protocol 1 is optimal and such that Alice and Bob can reconcile e ciently is comparable to nding e cient decodable error correcting codes. This is due to similarities between these two problems when a non-interactive protocol such as protocol 1 is being considered. The noninteractive scheme is relevant for some applications such as quantum oblivious transfer BBCS]. We will see that using H 3 (de ned below, for more details consult CW]) yields a decoding time complexity equivalent to that of solving the general problem of decoding linear codes.
De nition 7. An R p reconciliation protocol is:
1. e cient if there is a polynomial t(n) such that T R p (n) t(n) for n suciently large, where n is the length of the strings transmitted over the secret channel; 2. ideal if it is both optimal and e cient.
where T R p (n) represent the expected running time of R p given an n-bit long input string. Proof. If C is a class of decision problems, let C denote the class of problems that are polynomially equivalent to some problem in C. Let X be the problem of executing step 3 of protocol 1 and let X H3 be the same problem when H 3 is used. BMT] shows that determining least-weight solution in a system of linear equations in GF (2) To be useful in practice a reconciliation protocol need not be optimal. Before execution of the protocol, Alice and Bob can agree on an arbitrarily small amount of additional information relative to the theoretical bound, which they are willing to reveal during execution. If the resulting protocol is also e cient then we have a protocol that might be useful in practice. For example, if the bits exchanged over the secret channel are costly, then it might be better to spend more time computing during reconciliation, thus saving some more of these costly bits.
We will formalize the latter property, and construct in section 6.2 a family of protocols that satisfy it.
De nition
An almost-ideal protocol has an error probability approaching 0 as the length of the strings increases, but its amount of leaked information is allowed to be slightly greater than the theoretical bound. Alice and Bob indicate it by choosing a parameter . They must be able to set such that the corresponding amount of leaked information is as close to the theoretical bound as they wish. Once the parameter is set, the expected running time T Shell is constructed from a few simple interactive primitives described in the following sections.
BINARY. When strings A and B have an odd number of errors, then Alice and Bob can perform an interactive binary search to nd an error by exchanging fewer than d log ne bits over the public channel in the following manner:
1. Alice sends Bob the parity of the rst half of the string. 2. Bob determines whether an odd number of errors occurred in the rst half or in the second by testing the parity of the rst half and comparing it to the parity sent by Alice. 3. This process is repeatedly applied to the half determined in step 2. An error will be found eventually. The reconciliation protocol described in BBBSS] uses BINARY as the main primitive.
CONFIRM. If the strings of Alice and Bob are di erent, CONFIRM tells them with probability 1 2 ; if they are identical, CONFIRM says so with probability 1. 1. Alice and Bob choose a random subset of corresponding bits from their strings. 2. Alice tells Bob the parity of her subset. 3. Bob checks that his subset has the same parity.
They can apply this process k times to convince themselves that their strings are identical. This test will fail with probability 2 ?k . detects an error, all bits from Bob's corresponding block are set to equal Alice's bits. In pass s (s > 1), Alice and Bob join pairs of adjacent blocks from the preceding pass to form the blocks for the current pass. On each of these new blocks they execute BICONF 1 s times. When an error is found, the primary block containing the erroneous bit is replaced by Alice's corresponding primary block. The process is repeated until there is only one block at the current pass (at pass s = d log n k e).
An Almost Ideal Protocol
Suppose that R k bas has an error probability k 1=2 and leaked an amount respect to the distribution of the number of erroneous primary blocks that will be corrected. Therefore, if there are e erroneous primary blocks in a current block during pass s, the probability of correcting l of these is s (lje) as de ned by equation 1. Let p 0 s (e) be the probability of having e erroneous primary blocks in a current block after completion of pass s, and let p s (e) be the same probability before execution of pass s. It where " is the probability that a k 0 -bit-long block holds more than b d 2 c errors. However Shell is no longer almost-ideal with this type of basic protocol.
A Practical Protocol
In section 7.1 we present protocol Cascade, which can easily be implemented. Cascade leaks an amount of information close to the theoretical bound on a BSC(p) when p is as big as 15%. In section 7.2 a rough analysis shows how to choose protocol parameters for which the error probability decreases exponentially fast as a function of the number of passes. We also give a table comparing the amount of information leaked empirically by Cascade (given these parameters) to the theoretical bound. Bob corrects an error in each block whose parity di ers from that of Alice's corresponding block. At this point all of Bob's blocks have an even number of errors (possibly zero). This part of the protocol is taken from BBBSS]. However, in that paper the leaked information about the secret string is eliminated during execution by removing one bit of each subset for which the parity is known. In our protocol all the bits are kept. Saving this information from pass to pass allows us to correct more errors. 
Using Cascade
In this section a simple analysis using only one of Cascade's properties shows its usefulness in practice. This analysis yields a particular choice of block size such that the probability that a block K 1 v has one or more errors decreases exponentially with respect to the number of passes.
The property we use is that in the passes following pass 1, correcting an error in K 1 v implies that a second one from the same block K 1 v will be corrected.
For parameters k 1 ; : : : ; k ! chosen in a manner that depends on p, we will try to determine i (j), the probability that after the pass i 1, 2j errors remain in K 1 v . 1 (j) is easily determined for X Bin(k 1 ; p): 1 (j) = prob(X = 2j) + prob(X = 2j + 1) We can bound i (j) using i for i > 1
Suppose that k 1 is chosen such that
and let k i = 2k i?1 for i > v . Thus by corollary 11 the total amount of leaked information will approach that of Cascade. Table 1 gives the values of k 1 (the largest one satisfying 2 and 3) for p 2 f0:15; 0:10; 0:05; 0:01g and the values of I(4) are computed. In addition the average amount of leaked information b I(4) for 10 empirical tests (with n = 10; 000) under the same conditions is reported. For each of these tests all errors were corrected after pass 4. The reconciliation problem is a variant of the noisy coding problem. The extension of the noisy coding theorem Sh] due to Elias E] shows that there exist optimal linear codes. Thus, it is not surprising that there exist optimal reconciliation protocols. One must use the systematic version of an optimal linear code to obtain an optimal reconciliation protocol. While these results from information theory are non-constructive, all our results are constructive.
Theorem 8 gives an (unlikely) hypothesis for which non-interactive ideal reconciliation schemes exist. If we consider other classes of hash functions, it is possible to obtain ideal protocols based on weaker hypotheses. High performance non-interactive reconciliation protocols would be useful for e cient implementation of quantum oblivious transfer BBCS].
From a practical point of view, Cascade is an e cient protocol that leaks less information than the best error-correcting-codes-based reconciliation protocols. It is an improvement on the protoocol used in BBBSS] in a true quantum setting.
It would be of interest to have a detailed analysis of Cascade's performance that would tell how to choose the parameters so as to minimize the amount of leaked information while maintaining a low failure probability.
